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CRIMINAL LAW
GOOD FAITH AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: THE "REASONABLE"
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
EDNA F. BALL*
INTRODUCTION
As one of the law's more controversial creations,
the exclusionary rule has been the target of much
criticism.' Some critics decry its result - the rule
excludes reliable, probative evidence from the fact-
finding process and allows the guilty to go free.2
Others question its effectiveness - there is as yet
no compelling proof that suppression achieves its
goal of deterrence.3 The most recent objection, and
one which is gaining support, is aimed at the rule's
nonselective application. The exclusionary rule is
presently applied indiscriminately, without regard
to the nature of the underlying violation. Despite
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa;
Visiting Associate Professor of Law, 1978-79, The Uni-
versity of Toledo College of Law; J.D., Duke University;
L.L.M.; Temple University.
The exclusionary rule, or suppression doctrine, dis-
cussed in this article provides for the exclusion of evidence
obtained in violation of the Constitution. It was first
applied by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Later it was
imposed upon the states in Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
Evidence may also be suppressed if it is seized in
violation of statutes or regulations. See, e.g., United States
v. Mallory, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); United States v. Mc-
Nabb, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); United States v. McDaniels,
355 F. Supp. 1082 (1973).
For a summary of many criticisms of the rule, see
Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule
and Its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621, 656-84.
2 See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,496-98 (1976)
(Burger, C. J., concurring); Schneckloth v. -Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 267 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). Set also
sources cited id at 267 n.24.3 See, e.g., 428 U.S. at 499-500. See also Wright, Must
the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEx. L.
REv. 736, 738-41 (1972). Although deterrence is gener-
ally accepted as one of the goals of suppression, it has not
been universally accepted as its primary goal or under-
lying rationale. See text accompanying notes 157-73 infra
4 There are some circumstances in which the exclusion-
ary rule is not applied. However, they do not relate" to
the nature of the offense. See United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338 (1974) (grand jury proceedings); Linkletter
the disparity of the situations, both flagrant police
misconduct and hapless official error are uniformly
subjected to the same stringent sanction. This last
objection may have a profound impact upon the
future operation of the exclusionary rule. Through
a series of opinions issued since 1974, four current
members of the United States Supreme Court have
urged the adoption of a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule to meet this objection.! Such an
exception would provide that when an officer acts
in the good faith belief that his conduct is consti-
-tutional and where he has a reasonable basis for
that belief, the exclusionary rule will not operate.7
In fourth amendment cases,8 most good faith
violations concern the failure to meet the require-
ment of probable cause. Two basic types of viola-
tion are possible. First, an officer may make a
judgmental error concerning the existence of facts
sufficient to constitute probable cause. Such cases
may be characterized as examples of "good faith
mistake." 9 Second, an officer may rely upon a
statute which is later ruled unconstitutional, a
warrant which is later invalidated, or a court prec-
v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (retroactive application);
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) (impeach-
ment at trial).
SSee Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609-12 (1975)
(Powell, J., concurring in part).
6 Justice Powell, Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and
Chief Justice Burger have all expressed their support of
the good faith doctrine. See text accompanying notes
189-200 infia.
See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,538 (1976) (White,
J., dissenting).
8 The fourth amendment of the Constitution of the
United States provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
9 See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538-40 (1976)
(White, J., dissenting).
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edent which is later overruled. In each of these
cases, the officer may be deemed to have commit-
ted a "technical violation."10
Arguments concerning the good faith doctrine
have tended to concentrate upon its relationship to
the exclusionary rule. This is understandable since
the good faith doctrine makes certain debatable
assumptions concerning the rule's rationale, goals
and efficacy. Ultimately, however, the proposed
good faith exception must be examined and judged
in light of the requirements of the fourth amend-
ment.
To that end, the discussion that follows will focus
upon the relationship between good faith and the
fourth amendment requirement of probable cause.
It will explore the extent to which the good faith
doctrine is supported by historical and decisional
antecedents, and it will assess the effect which the
proposed exception would have upon the interpre-
tation of fourth amendment rights." The discus-
sion is principally concerned with the treatment of
good faith by the United States Supreme Court
and will emphasize Supreme Court opinions.
CIVIL LAW IN THE 19Ts CENTURY: DEVELOPING
DOCTRINES OF PROBABLE CAUSE AND GOOD FAITH
The Doctrine of Probable Cause
When the founding fathers elevated the princi-
ple of reasonable search and seizure to "constitu-
tional instead of ... merely legal significance,"'
2
they simultaneously engendered an unending con-
stitutional debate over the scope of the restrictions
imposed on the government. As Professor Amster-
dam has noted, the Bill of Rights is a profoundly
anti-government document which must often be
seen by those primarily concerned with crime con-
trol as thwarting necessary means to legitimate
1°See, e.g., Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611-12
(1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part). In this article, the
term "technical violation" will always refer to a violation
of the fourth amendment resulting from a subsequent
determination that a statute, warrant, or previous court
decision relied upon by the police does not meet consti-
tutional requirements. It should not be confused with the
broader concept of a "procedural violation."
" A related issue is the desirability of a good faith
exception. It is not the purpose of this article either to
explore this question extensively or to resolve it; however,
the issue is briefly examined. See text at notes 230-36
in"i1N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
13 (1937). See generally for an excellent history of the early
development of the fourth amendment.
objectives.1 3 There is no doubt that this result was
intended. The purpose of the Bill of Rights was to
place certain "great rights" beyond the power of
any branch of government to subvert them for the
alleged good of the people. 4 The fourth amend-
ment, in particular, responded to the use in the
colonies of general warrants granting unrestricted
powers to search.15 Although by 1789 such war-
rants had been condemned not only in the new
states but also in England,16 the states were not
satisfied with a constitution which lacked specific
protection against general warrants and demanded
the security of an explicit guarantee in the Bill of
Rights.1
7
The fourth amendment prohibits both "unrea-
sonable searches and'seizures" and introduces the
requirement of probable cause.1 8 Although the
term "probable cause" has a certain legalistic ring
to it, it did not arrive complete with an established
definition or explanatory annotation. Since its in-
herent lack of precision is coupled with the need to
apply it to varying factual situations, courts con-
struing this provision must ponder not only what
was considered probable cause when the amend-
ment was adopted, but also how that concept
may be fairly applied to the circumstances of sub-
sequent generations. Presumably, if Congress were
13 Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REv. 349, 353 (1974).
14 I. BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHrs 46-59 (1965).
"5 The most famous general warrants used in the col-
onies were Writs of Assistance used by customs officers to
detect smuggled goods. Granting a.continuous license to
search at will for the life of the issuing sovereign, the
Writs usually permitted searches wherever the collector's
suspicion directed. N. LASSON, supra note 12, at 51-56.16 In England, the general warrant was condemned in
Entick v. Carrington, XIX State Trials 1029 (1765). In
the colonies, general warrants were prohibited by provi-
sions in the state bills of rights. See N. LASSON, supra note
12, at 79-82.
'7 N. LASSON, supra note 12, at 88-89, 89 n.40.
s The formulation of the fourth amendment with- two
clauses separately providing a right against unreasonable
searches and seizures and a requirement of probable
cause is discussed and persuasively explained by Lasson.
N. LASSON, supra note 12, at 101-03. Although it was
debated whether a search and seizure, as opposed to a
warrant, lacking probable cause was per se "unreasona-
ble," the basic principle now established is that a search
or seizure without probable cause violates the prohibition
in the first clause. See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 358
U.S. 307 (1959) (applying the probable cause standard
to a case involving a warrantless search). But cf., Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (limited intrusion based on less
than probable cause, discussed in text of notes 143-49
infra.); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543




now to enact legislation authorizing "Writs of As-
sistance," the Court would have no difficulty hold-
ing such legislation unconstitutional. The difficulty
lies, now as in the past, with those cases which
involve the close judgments of law enforcement
officials who must assess the existence of probable
cause while in the field.
Looking to the case law of the nineteenth century
for the development of the doctrine of probable
cause, one is immediately struck by the paucity of
cases both in the Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts. There are several reasons for this
scarcity. First, the right to appeal to the Supreme
Court in criminal cases was not granted until
1891.' 9 Although this did not preclude Supreme
Court consideration of probable cause, it did con-
fine that consideration to civil cases. As will be
seen, those civil cases are significant to the devel-
opment of probable cause and illuminate contem-
porary thought on the issue. However, the fact
remains that the number of early Supreme Court
pronouncements on the subject was markedly lim-
ited by the lack of criminal appellate jurisdiction.
The slow expansion of general federal criminal
jurisdiction limited the handling of cases involving
probable cause by the lower federal courts as well.
Prior to the late nineteenth century, Congress
rarely exercised its power to legislate in criminal
areas and most federal criminal cases dealt with
maritime crime or crimes directly injurious to the
central government2m Finally, beginning with the
Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, monopoly, prohi-
bition, kidnapping and narcotics successively be-
came notable targets of Congressional action and
federal criminal jurisdiction began its major
growth.21 Because this growth commenced almost
simultaneously with the bestowal of federal appel-
late criminal review, opportunities to construe the
fourth amendment were effectively increased.
Nonetheless, since the fourth amendment was not
held applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment until 1949, the most extensive devel-
opment of search and seizure law remained far
ahead.s" It was not until Mapp v. Ohi6o2 imposed
' 
9 See Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 827. This act also
created the circuit courts of appeals and authorized them
to review certain criminal cases.
The Supreme Court was always able to review habeas
corpus petitions. See, eg., Ex parte Bollman and
Swartwout, 8 US. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
a0 e Schwartz, Fedoral CriminalJurisdiin and Proseu-
tors'Discretion, 13 L & Com-ra. PNon. 64,65-67 (1948).
21 See N. LAssoN, supra note 12, at 106.
2 The fourth amendment was declared to be applica-
the exclusionary rule upon the states and Fay v.
Noia? opened the floodgates of habeas corpus re-
view, that the doctrine found its fullest use and
expression.
There were, of course, some early state cases
dealing with probable cause, since many states had
a constitution or bill of rights containing language
equivalent to that of the fourth amendment.2
5
However, even in the state courts there were very
few criminal cases which raised the issue. At that
time, there was no valid objection to pertinent
evidence obtained through illegal search or seizure.
If the evidence was otherwise admissible, the courts
would not inquire into its acquisition.2s Conse-
quently, in both state and federal jurisdictions, the
ble to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949). In 1833, the Supreme Court ruled that the Bill of
Rights applied only to the federal courts unless otherwise
expressly provided. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)
243 (1833). Later, the Court explicitly stated that the
fourth amendment only restrained the issue of warrants
under federal law and was not applicable to state process.
Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855). Al-
though after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment
in 1868, the issue of the application of the amendment to
the states through the fourteenth amendment was raised
several times before the Supreme Court, the Court man-
aged to side-step the question until Wolf See, e.g., Ham-
mond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1909);
Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U.S. 541
(1908); Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904). For a
discussion of the incorporation doctrine, see Friendly, The
Bill of Rights as a Code of Cririnal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L.
Rev. 929,933-40 (1965).
2 367 US. 643 (1961).
2 372 U.S. 391 (1963). The floodgates were partially
closed by Sone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), which
limited a state prisoner's access to federal habeas corpus
relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an uncon-
stitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.
2 See, eg., Connor v. Commonwealth, 3 Binn. 38 (Pa.
1810) construing PA. CoNsr. art. 9, § 8, which provided
in pertinent part that:
... the people shall be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable
searches and seizures; and that no warrant to search
any place or to seize any person or things, shall
issue, without describing them as nearly as may be,
nor without probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation-
2.,e.g., Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass (2 Met.)
329 (1841). The groundwork for the suppression of ille-
gally obtained evidence was laid in Boyd v. United
States, 116 US. 616 (1886), which equated compulsory
production of evidence against oneself in violation of the
fifth amendment with an unreasonable search and sei-
zure, and held that the compelled evidence had been
unconstitutionally admitted- Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914), built upon the decision in Boyd and
19781
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initial interpretations of the doctrine of probable
cause are primarily found in civil cases.
Civil suits in which probable cause was an im-
portant issue included admiralty cases of seizure
and prize, revenue forfeiture cases, and cases claim-
ing malicious prosecution. Cases of capture and
prize often involved demands for compensation for
wrongful seizure,27 and if the seizure was based
upon probable cause, damages would not be
awarded.2S Similarly, in revenue cases seeking dam-
ages for forfeiture or trespass, a showing of probable
cause would protect seizing officers from liability.'
Probable cause issues also arose in cases of mali-
cious prosecution, because its absence was not only
a key element of the action,s° but also raised an
inference of malice.ai
Because probable cause was often dispositive of
these claims, the Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts were frequently required to define
the concept and determine its existence in partic-
ular civil situations. Although the contexts were
slightly different from those of criminal cases, the
relationship to criminal law was clear. Malicious
prosecution presupposed the initiation of a crimi-
nal proceeding. t 2 Capture, prize and forfeiture all
involved seizures which deprived the injured party
established the exclusionary rule by holding that evidence
secured in violation of the fourth amendment would not
be admissible in federal court.
27 See I CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL
PEACE, PRIZE CASES DECIDED IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 1789-1918, at 2 (1923). Prize cases here
include those involving capture, recapture and forfeiture
for violation of revenue and embargo acts. Sometimes the
term "prize" is used narrowly to refer only to seizures in
time of war. See, e.g., United States v. Reindeer, 27 F.
Cas. 758, 768 (C.C.D.R.I. 1844) (No. 16,145).
ssThe Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 372 (1824);
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
64, 122 (1804).
'See, e.g., Averill v. Smith, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 82, 91
(1872) (trespass); Sixty Pipes of Brandy, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 421, 425-26 (1825) (forfeiture). Often a statute
would protect the collector from liability in cases of
wrongful seizure where there was reasonable cause for
the seizure by requiring the court to issue a certificate of
probable cause which would effectively bar claims. See,
e.g., Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 643-44 (1878).
aThe elements of an action for malicious prosecution
are: (1) a criminal proceeding instituted or continued by
the defendant against the plaintiff; (2) termination of the
proceeding in favor of the accused; (3) absence of prob-
able cause for the proceeding; (4) "malice" or a primary
purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice.
W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 835 (4th ed. 1971).
31 Id. at 839.
' See note 30 supra.
of property as a penalty for alleged misconduct
and were thus quasi-criminal in nature.SS The
"probable cause" which was defined in these civil
cases was the same probable cause requirement
arising in criminal cases.S When the Supreme
Court finally attained jurisdiction over criminal
appeals, it both cited and applied the formulations
developed in the earlier civil decisions.S
The definition of probable cause arising from
these cases reflects the common origin and concep-
tual overlap of tort and crime.36 The standard
imposed demands "reasonable suspicion" and its
ultimate delineation is not unlike the "reasonable
man" test of tort law. Somewhat less stringent than
the construction of probable cause which subse-
quently developed, it adheres to rules of reasonable
justification which antedate the terminology
"probable cause."3 7
One of the earliest cases defining probable cause
is Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy,ss an admiralty
case in which one of the appellant's argued that
probable cause should excuse him from damages
resulting from wrongful captureS Chief Justice
Marshall wrote for the court and held that proba-
ble cause required "substantial reason for believ-
ing" that the vessel could be legally seized,4° and
would be satisfied only by facts furnishing 'just
cause of suspicion.' 1 Later Marshall refined this
ss See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886).
"[P]roceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the
forfeiture of a man's property by reason of offences
committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are
in their nature criminal."
m See Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts: I, 43
COLUM. L. REv. 753 (1943).
5 See, e.g. Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435, 441
(1925) (citing Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642 (1878));
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 159-61 (1925)
(citing The Thompson, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 155 (1865); The
Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824); The George, 10
F. Cas. 201 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 5,328); Locke v.
United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339 (1813)).
w See generally Hall, supra note 34. The A.L.I. Model
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, §§ 120.1, 210.1 (Proposed
Official Draft, 1975) uses the term "reasonable cause to
believe" as the equivalent of "probable cause," not in its
historic sense.
' Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV (probable cause)
with Samuel v. Payne, 99 Eng. Rep. 230 (1780) (reason-
ably probable grounds of suspicion) and Proposed
Amendment 14 of the Committee of 20 of the Constitu-
tional Convention quoted in N. L.ASON, supra note 12, at
95 n.61 (legal and sufficient cause).





view in Locke v. United States " where, somewhat
overconfidently, he stated that "the term 'probable
cause' ... in all cases of seizure, has a fixed and
well known meaning. It imports a seizure made
under dreumstances which warrant suspicion."
The idea of probable cause as a reasonable
ground of suspicion was also voiced by Justice
Washington's charge to the jury as Circuit Justice
in Munns v. De Nemours." In response to his own
query as to the meaning of the term, Washington
did not merely answer "a reasonable ground of
suspicion," but went on to define it further as
"supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief,
that the person accused is guilty of the offence with
which he is charged."' " This formulation clearly
echoes the "reasonable man" standard dominating
the law of torts, a standard which emphasizes
prudent action under the circumstances." Not con-
fined to use in the federal courts, the definition also
was applied by state courts which closely followed
the language in Munns.47
The federal court decisions which construed
probable cause used similar words, varying only
slightly from "circumstances which warrant suspi-
cion ' s to "reasonable suspicion" 9" to "reasonable
ground of suspicion. ' 5° The emphasis in all of these
opinions is upon reasonable search and seizure
based on circumstances which would cause a pru-
dent man to entertain suspicion. That the theory
running through them is consistent was confirmed
by the Supreme Court in its 1878 decision, Stacey
v. Emery.51 Accepting Munns and similar federal and
state cases, the Stacey Court concluded that all of
the definitions are essentially the same and equated
probable cause with the earlier expression "reason-
able cause."
5 2
The nineteenth century interpretation of prob-
42 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339 (1813).
3 Id at 348 (emphasis added).
44 See 17 F. Cas. 993 (C.C.D. Pa. 1811) (No. 9,926).
4Id. at 995.
46 See W. PROSSER, supra note 30, at 149-51, 157.
47 See, e.g., McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881);
Foshay v. Ferguson, 2 Denio 616, 619 (N.Y. 1846).
4The Thompson, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 155, 162 (1865);
The George, 10 F. Cas. 201, 202 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815)
(No. 5,328).
49 Sixty Pipes of Brandy, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 421, 427
(1825).
50The Thompson, 70 U.S. (3 Wall) 155, 163 (1865);
United States v. The Recorder, 27 F. Cas. 723, 724
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1849) (No. 16,130).5' 97 U.S. 642 (1878).
n2d. at 645-46.
able cause was thus arguably less exacting than
later constructions. It should not, however, be mis-
taken for the "mere suspicion" test which was
consistently rejected. Reasonable suspicion had to be
grounded in facts and, where a warrant was in-
volved, supported by oath. Suspicion based upon
common rumor and report was insufficient.53
There had to be factual support.5 The test was not
subjective, but rather imposed objective criteria. In
situations where the underlying facts were not
sufficient to render the suspicion reasonable, the
Court condemned the attendant search or seizure.ss
Good Faith Mistake
The early civil cases also reveal a nascent good
faith doctrine. These cases may be conceptually
divided into the same subcategories of good faith
mistake and technical violation that would be gov-
erned by the suggested good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. However, unlike their contem-
porary counterparts, they do not share a common
basis for disposition. Although the early cases in-
volving technical violations, like those defining
probable cause, may be directly linked to modem
criminal doctrines, they depart from the modem
view in both analysig and resolution. On the other
hand, the early cases involving good faith mistake
are even more analogous to present criminal cases
and they will be seen to adhere fairly closely to the
theory and result of the proposed good faith excep-
tion.
In examining good faith mistake, it is necessary
to return again to actions grounded in tort. Under
tort law, two types of concessions are generally
made to the good faith or proper motivation of a
party who causes an injury. First, although he may
actually be held liable for his wrongful actions, a
well-meaning party is likely to escape the imposi-
tion of punitive damages.' Second, a well-inten-
tioned party, by definition, will not provide the
requisite element of intentional wrongdoing or
malice that is required to sustain certain causes of
5 See, e.g., Connor v. Commonwealth, 3 Binn. 38 (Pa.
1810).
4 See, e.g., Ex Parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448,
451 (1806).
w See, e.g., Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S.
"(2 Cranch) 64 (1804); See also Ex Parte Bollman &
Swartwout, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807) (citing article 10
of the Virginia Bill of Rights).
'6 See W. PROSSER, supra note 30, at 9-11. Punitive
damages have been called an invasion of ideas of criminal
law into the field of torts. IdJ at 9.
19781
action. 57 Both of these concessions to good faith
error are illustrated by the civil cases dealing with
unintentional mistakes as to the ixistence of prob-
able cause. In the context of punitive damages,
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsys presents an initial
treatment of good faith error by Chief Justice
Marshall.
In Charming Betsy, an errant captain who without
probable cause had seized a ship was protected
from the imposition of punitive damages by what
amounted to good faith. Because the circumstances
of the case produced a conviction in the Court that
the captain had "acted upon correct motives from
a sense of duty," the fact that he trusted suspicions
too "light" to constitute probable cause did not
result in added damages. 59 Although the Court
affirmed compensation for actual damages,60 the
violation of constitutional rights did not in itself
command a remedy. In fact, the idea of redress for
the unlawful seizure does not appear to have been
considered by Marshall. Not unlike modem juries
hearing claims against police officers, the Chief
Justice was primarily concerned that a public of-
ficer attempting to do his duty might be subjected
to an oppressive judgment.6'
An officer who acted in good faith could fare
equally well in malicious prosecution cases. Be-
cause malice was required in addition to an absence
of probable cause, if the officer could establish that
he acted upon proper motivation, he could escape
liability for his unlawful conduct. Both state and
federal courts relied on this principle,62 and al-
though a lack of probable cause would give rise to
an inference of malice, the defendant who could
refute that inference would suffer no sanction.
6 3
The law governing malicious prosecution can
thus be reduced to three equations:
First, no probable cause plus risalice equals sanc-
tion; here both elements required to sustain the
cause of action are present.
Second, probable cause plus malice equals no
sanction; here the existence of probable cause makes
the conduct lawful.
57 hd at 23-25.
586 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).0 Id. at 124.
6o Id. at 125.
61 Id. at 124.
62 See, e.g., Munns v. De Nemours, 17 F. Cas. 993, 995
(C.C.D. Pa. 1811) (No. 9,926); Foshay v. Ferguson, 2
Denio 616, 619-20 (N.Y. 1846); Ulmer v. Leland, I Me.
135, 137-38 (1820).
6 See, e.g., Munns v. De Nemours, 17 F. Cas. 993, 995
(C.C.D. Pa. 1811) (No. 9,926).
Third, no probable cause plus no malice equals
no sanction; despite the lack of probable cause,
proper motivation precludes liability.
An evidentiary rule to the first equation is that no
probable cause will result in an inference of malic.
and will thus lead to sanction unless the inference
is rebutted.
Although lack of malice is not quite the same as
good faith, it is sufficiently analogous to permit a
direct comparison of these equations with the prin-
ciples which govern the imposition of the sanction
of exclusion in cases of search and seizure. The
formulae governing the relationship between prob-
able cause and good faith in search and seizure
cases can be established by substituting a lack of
good faith for malice in the original equations:
First, no probable cause plus no good faith equals
sanction; the evidence is excluded.
Second, probable cause plus no good faith equals
no sanction; probable cause makes the conduct
lawful.
Third, no probable cause plus good faith equals
sanction; at present, the exclusionary rule is applied
in the absence of probable cause notwithstanding
the officer's good faith.
Because this third theorem renders good faith ir-
relevant where there is no probable cause, an evi-
dentiary rule dealing with inferences likewise be-
comes inconsequential.
It is only in the third equation that the treatment
of motivation in search and seizure cases differs
from that in malicious prosecution cases, and it is
precisely here that the proposed good faith excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule would work a change
that would bring them into total conformity. Un-
der the good faith exception, no probable cause
plus good faith would equal no sanction, that is,
no exclusion of evidence obtained through unlaw-
ful search or seizure. As in malicious prosecution
cases, proper motive would bar the imposition of
sanctions for unlawful acts. While an evidentiary
rule related to the first equation was unnecessary
when the lack of probable cause alone dictated a
sanction, a useful rule could now be established.
No probable cause would result in an inference of
no good faith and would also lead to sanction
unless the inference were rebutted. Thus, quite
appropriately, should the state fail to meet its
burden of establishing probable cause, supression
would continue to be the presumed result and
would only be avoided if the state affirmatively
established good faith.
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One may well ask why the teaching of early civil
cases is relevant to the development of modem
rules of criminal procedure. The question is partic-
ularly apt when, as in cases of malicious prosecu-
tion, these are doctrines which still possess vitality
and could be dismissed as a feature unique to that
area of the substantive law. Putting aside the con-
ceptual overlap of tort and crime, perhaps the best
answer is that the nineteenth century civil cases
dealing with unintentional mistake concerning
probable cause gave the early courts their only
opportunities to consider the definition of probable
cause and the effect that good faith would have on
the implementation of that doctrine. Since the
Court has been willing to use these decisions to
define probable cause in later criminal cases, 64 it is
not inappropriate to look to them for guidance in
the area of good faith as well. Indeed, the Supreme
Court itself continues to cite civil cases on good
faith and probable cause for guidance in criminal
cases.
For instance, Director General v. Kastenban, 65 a
false imprisonment case, has been cited by the
Court for the proposition that good faith does not
constitute probable cause.66 Although this is a fair
reading of the case, Kastenbaun cannot'be read as
making good faith irrelevant to probable cause in
criminal cases. It is one thing to say that good faith
does not equal probable cause; it is quite another
to say that where there is no probable cause, good
faith will not affect the imposition of a sanction.
Likewise, a case su6h as Stacey v. Emery, which holds
that malice or good faith is not an element where
the question is not motive but probable cause,
should not be interpreted to mean that good faith
cannot temper the effect of a lack of probable
cause.67 In Stacey, probable cause had already been
established; however, the petitioner sought dam-
ages on the theory that malice negated probable
cause. Consequently, the case merely reiterates the
principle that probable cause always provides a
lawful basis for search and seizure, regardless of
motive, a point that was clearly made by the
second equation derived from the malicious pros-
ecution and the search and seizure cases.
6 See cases cited note 35 supra. Justice McReynolds
also argued that reliance on the civil cases was misplaced.
See text accompanying notes 106-10 infra.
6 263 U.S. 25 (1923).
"See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959);
Carroll v. United States, 267 US. 132, 161 (1924).67 See Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642 (1878). &t also
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959).
Rather than being used as a basis for ignoring
good faith, the civil cases involving mistaken judg-
ments could better be interpreted as indicating
that valid concessions to good faith error may be
made. Although the treatment of motive in relation
to probable cause under tort law may not be
directly applicable to the modern law of criminal
procedure, it does demonstrate that, at least on the
civil side, there may be violations of constitutional
rights which result in neither sanction nor remedy.
Whether this approach should be extended to the
criminal arena and the application of the exclu-
sionary rule is a question which may depend upon
the source of the suppression doctrine no less than
upon policy for its answer. If instead of being a
deterrent sanction, or a remedy, the exclusionary
rule is actually part of a constitutional right, it is
the constitution which will require a different treat-
ment of the good faith mistake.e8
Technical Violations
Technical violations result not from an officer's
reasonable but mistaken judgment as to facts con-
stituting probable cause, but rather from his rea-
sonable conduct predicated upon apparently valid
legal directives.69 Today, when an officer relies
upon a statute or a statutory construction which is
later rejected by the court as unconstitutional or
incorrect, his action could be considered a technical
violation and any challenged evidence could be
eligible for the proposed good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule. 0
During the nineteenth century, this situation
was analyzed in a theoretically different, but func-
tionally consonant way. Although, as a practical
matter, both in the past and under the proposed
'See text accompanying notes 157-75 infra.
69 As previously defined, technical violations of the
fourth amendment are those which occur because an.
officer acted in reliance upon a statute which is later
declared unconstitutional, a warrant which is rejected as
insufficient, or an interpretation of the law which is
subsequently overruled. &e Introduction and note 11
sup'ra.
See, e.g., Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 591, 611-12
(Powell, J., concurring); Peltier v. United States, 422
U.S. 531 (1975). Peltier was a retroactivity case and was
decided upon principles established in preceding cases
concerning the retroactive application of constitutional
rulings. See id at 535. However, the bulk of the majority
opinion is devoted to establishing that the policies under-
lying the exclusionary rule do not require retroactive
application in cases where officials acted in good faith
reliance upon administrative regulations and judicial
opinions. See id at 536-542 and text accompanying notes
76-89 and notes 174-228 infra.
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good faith exception the official conduct would not
be penalized, the reason for this treatment has
changed. Where there would now be a determi-
nation that a violation of the fourth amendment
will not be punished because of the officer's good
faith, in the past there was a determination that
the existence of probable cause rendered the seizure
reasonable.
An illustrative case is United States v. The Re-
corder,"1 which concerned a ship seized for violating
federal navigation laws. The forfeiture was based
upon a construction of the navigation act which
had been adopted by the Secretary of the Treasury
in conformity with an opinion of the Attorney
General.72 When the case was heard, the court
decided that the official construction was erroneous
and that the statute had not been violated.73 How-
ever, despite the fact that the correct construction
of the statute did not provide grounds for arrest,
the court also held that the officer was entitled to
a certificate of probable cause. Because the attor-
ney general's opinion had afforded the seizing of-
ficer a fair reason for believing that the law had
been violated, the seizure was considered to have
been based upon reasonable grounds.
74
The theory underlying this case75 is that just as
probable cause could be based on facts which
furnish a reasonable ground of suspicion, so too it
could be based on a statute or statutory construc-
7" 27 F. Cas. 723 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1849) (No. 16,130).
72 Id. at 723.
' United States v. The Recorder, 27 F. Cas. 718
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1849) (No. 16,129).74 1d.
"s United States v. The Friendship, 9 F. Cas. 825
(C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 5,125) is similar to The Recorder.
In The Friendship, a ship was seized under a statute which
was interpreted differently in different judicial circuits.
The disputed construction was of Section 2 of the Act
of April 25, 1808, 2 Stat. 499. There was originally some
uncertainty as to whether the ship was being detained
under Section 11 of the same act, which did not require
probable cause but only an opinion of the officer that
there was an intent to violate the embargo act. See Section
11 of the Act of April 25, 1808, 2 Stat. 501. Although
Section 11 probably violated the fourth amendment,
cases construing it do not reflect the Court's interpreta-
tion of probable cause. See, e.g., Otis v. Watkins, 13 U.S.
(9 Cranch) 339 (1815); Crowell v. McFadon, 12 U.S. (8
Cranch) 93 (1814). It has been aptly suggested that the
Court was remiss in not declaring Section 11 and similar
legislation unconstitutional. See Stengel, The Background of
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
Part Two, 4 U. RIcH. L. REv. 60, 75 (1969). Two years
after the seizure of the Friendship, the Supreme Court
resolved the conflict in The Paulina v. United States, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 52 (1812). The Court rejected the inter-
tion which does the same. Moreover, a subsequent
determination that there was no valid authoriza-
tion for the seizure did not destroy that reasonable
ground or give rise to a sanction. All that was
necessary was that a reasonable reading of the
statute or construction warranted the officer in his
belief that the search or seizure was authorized at
the time it was conducted.
Peltier v. United States,76 which prompted Justice
Brennan's most impassioned attack on the good
faith doctrine, is factually similar to The Recorder
and the other early cases. 7 In Peltier, border patrol
agents had conducted a warrantless automobile
search pursuant to a federal statute authorizing
such searches "within a reasonable distance from
any external boundary of the United States."
78
Administrative regulations defined a "reasonable
distance" as up to one hundred miles, and federal
courts repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of
searches under the Act.79 In 1973, the Supreme
Court had held in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States
that the accepted construction of the Act was
unconstitutional and that such searches violated
the fourth amendment.'o Peltier's conviction was
based on evidence seized during a search conducted
pursuant to the Act four months before the decision
in Almeida-Sanchez.5 Peltier asserted that the evi-
dence used to convict him should have been sup-
pressed because of the illegality of the search. How-
ever the Court ruled that Almeida-Sanchez would
not be applied retroactively and thus refused to
exclude the evidence.8
The Peltier Court looked to the purposes of the
exclusionary rule and concluded that neither ju-
dicial integrity nor deterrence required a retroac-
tive application of Almeida-Sanchez. The Court be-
lieved that the use of evidence seized by officers
who acted "in good faith compliance with the
then-prevailing constitutional norms" does not of-
fend the "imperative of judicial integrity" even if
pretation which allowed the seizure of the Friendship.
Based on The Paulina, the Friendship court certified prob-
able cause since the seizure was supportable under the
rejected interpretation.
76422 U.S. 531 (1975).
77 See note 75 supra.
78 See 422 U.S. at 539-40 and the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §,1357(a)(3), quoted
id. at n.6.
' Peltier v. United States, 422 U.S. 531, 539-40 & n.8
(1975). But see idt at 545-46 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
8°413 U.S. 266 (1973).




a subsequent decision broadens the exclusionary
rule to include such evidenceas Further, the deter-
rent purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be
served by its application to police conduct under-
taken in good faith.8a Given the agents'justifiable
reliance upon a validly eqacted statute supported
by administrative regulations and judicial ap-
proval, the Court held that nothing required that
the evidence be suppressed.ss
The parallels between Peltier and the earlier cases
are easily drawn. For instance, the officers in both
Peltier and The Recorder acted in reliance upon an
erroneous statutory construction promulgated by
the Attorney General.86 Similarly, in both Peltier
and United States v. The Friendship,8 the rejected
construction had received prior judicial approval
and the Supreme Court decision which invalidated
the construction was announced subsequent to the
challenged seizure. Where Peltier diverges from the
earlier cases is in its underlying premise.
Peltier is based on the principle that where an
officer acts in good faith reliance upon statutes,
regulations and federal court decisions, the evi-
dence obtained from his search and seizure should
not be excluded if a subsequent court decision
renders such searches and seizures unconstitu-
tional. The Court assumes that the challenged
search and seizure is unconstitutional under the
fourth amendment, but it declares that because of
the officer's good faith, the exclusionary sanction
should not be applied. In contrast, the premise
underlying the nineteenth century cases is that
there has been no violation of the fourth amend-
ment because the judicial and administrative con-
structions of the statutes then in existence gave the
officers probable cause to believe that the law had
been violated. This theory could not have been
applied in Peltier because the construction relied
upon by the officers merely gave them reason to
believe that their searches were valid despite a lack
of either warrants or probable cause. The statute
was read as authorizing a border search which did
not require probable cause.88 Because of this fun-
8 Id at 536-37.
8 Id at 538-39.
SId at 542.
Compare Peltier v. United States, 422 U.S. 531 (1975)
with United States v. The Recorder, 27 F. Cas. 723
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1849) (No. 16, 130).
8 Compare Peltier v. United States, 422 U.S. 531 (1975),
with United States v. The Friendship, 9 F. Cas. 825
(C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 5, 125).
Border searches of anyone are permissible without
probable cause based on the sovereign right of the nation
damental difference in Peltier, a difference which
necessitates a reliance upon retroactivity principles
while stressing the good faith doctrine, Peltier itself
could not be treated like the early cases. This is not
true, however, of other cases involving technical
violations which raise the issue of good faith so
For instance, in Stone v. Powell ° the court of
appeals reversed the defendant's conviction, in
part, because it was based on evidence found when
he was arrested for violating a vagrancy ordinance
later held unconstitutional. Although the arresting
officers were enforcing statutes in good faith, the
court of appeals felt that excluding the evidence
might deter legislators from enacting unconstitu-
tional statutes."t Although the good faith issue was
briefed and argued before the Supreme Court,92
the case was decided on the scope of the availability
of federal habeas corpus relief to state prisoners. 9
Nonetheless, the argument for a good faith excep-
tion is clearly presented in Justice White's dissent
which shares the outlook of the majority opinion
on limiting the reach of the exclusionary rule.
As stated in White's dissent, when an officer acts
on the basis of a statute which is later held uncon-
stitutional, either on its face or as applied, he is
merely doing his duty in good faith and on reason-
able grounds. Although there has been an invasion
of the defendant's privacy, the defendant has no
to protect its territorial integrity through the exclusion of
foreign nationals. Persons entering the country may be
required to identify themselves as entitled to enter and
their belongings as effects which may lawfully be brought
into the country. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 154 (1925); Note, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNA'rL L. 277,
291 (1976).
8 See note 75 supra. On October 2, 1978, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Michigan v. De Fillippo, 80
Mich. App. 197, 262 N.W.2d 921 (1977), cert. granted, 99
S. Ct. 76 (1978), and will consider the question of whether
an arrest made in good faith reliance on an ordinance
which had not then been declared unconstitutional, is
valid without regard to the constitutionality of the statute
ordinance. In its petition for certiorari, the state claimed
that the application of the exclusionary rule would serve
no purpose because it could have no deterrent effect. It
cites United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975), in
support of this position. The petition argues that the
Court should consider both the existence of probable
cause and the application of a good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule for a "technical violation."
90507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'don other grounds, 428
U.S. 465 (1976).
9' Id. at 98.
92 See Brief for Petitioner at 11-38, Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1975); Brief for Petitioner, at 35-38, and Brief
for Respondent at 41-57, Wolff v. Rice (companion case).
9 428 U.S. at 494-95.
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right to civil damages and he should not be entitled
to the exclusion of any probative evidence which
was seized.94 Exclusion in such cases could have no
deterrent effect and judicial integrity would not be
impaired when evidence is admitted after a viola-
tion has occurred, particularly when there has been
only "mistaken, but unintentional and faultless,
conduct by enforcement officers."
95
Implicit in Justice White's analysis is the as-
sumption that the search was in violation of the
fourth amendment. However, the analysis applied
to the early admiralty cases could easily be used.
Under that theory a reasonable although mistaken
reliance upon the validity of a statute or construc-
tion of a statute is sufficient to establish probable
cause, and that probable cause continues to render
the search reasonable even when the statute or
construction is subsequently rejected. It would be
consistent with that approach to hold that the
search in Stone was legal and, consequently, that
the exclusionary rule was inapplicable.9 The valid-
ity of a search or seizure would be measured against
the facts and law known to an officer at the time
he acts. The subsequent acquisition of information
that proves that a person is innocent of the crime
for which he was arrested neither negates probable
cause at the time of arrest nor requires that evi-
dence seized incident to that arrest be suppressed.
Likewise, the subsequent pronouncement of the
misconstruction or unconstitutionality of a statute
need not render seizures invalid.
At first glance, this theory seems to go much
further than Peltier in its effect upon the seizure;
however, the practical effects of the two positions
are the same, that is, no sanction or remedy results.
The good faith exception thus functions consist-
ently with its nineteenth century precursors to the
extent that it credits the reasonableness of conduct
predicated upon apparent law and shields the
official's conduct from sanction. Although accord-
ing to modem interpretation these searches and
seizures may now be considered as violations of the
fourth amendment, the early cases at least provide
Id. at 540-42 (White, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 540 (White, J., dissenting).
9 Although the statute in Stone was invalidated on due
process grounds, it is possible for a vagrancy statute to be
held unconstitutional because it violates the fourth
amendment requirement of probable cause by permitting
arrests on mere suspicion. See United States v. Hall, 459
F.2d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1972). However, this would not
change the officer's reasonable basis for a good faith
belief that he was making an arrest based on probable
cause.
support for acknowledging the importance of the
officer's good faith and for not imposing suppres-
sion.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN THE 20TH CENTURY:
PROBABLE CAUSE AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The seventy-five years between 1886 and 1961
encompassed a second era of fourth amendment
development. Beginning with Boyd v. United States
and ending with Mapp v. Ohio, the period was
marked by several significant changes in the realm
of criminal justice.97 Federal criminal jurisdiction
began its great expansions the suppression doc-
trine was formulated and imposed on the federal
courts,9 and a substantial number of criminal cases
construing the fourth amendment were amassed.
Although expanded criminal jurisdiction was influ-
ential, it was the suppression doctrine which
prompted the litigation that led to definitive Su-
preme Court decisions. Once a violation of the
fourth amendment could have a practical effect
upon the disposition of cases, the interpretation of
its requirements became central to many appeals.
Fourth Amendment Requirements Evolve
The primary evolution of fourth amendment
doctrine away from the theory of the nineteenth
century coincided with Prohibition and reflected
the political and social objectives of the time. The
eighteenth amendment became effective on Janu-
ary 16, 1920, and out of twenty-three search and
seizure decisions rendered by the Supreme Court
between 1921 and 1938, t °0 eighteen involved liquor
97 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), presaged
the adoption of the exclusionary rule in an opinion which
ruled against the admissibility of evidence which the
defendent was compelled to produce against himself in
violation of the fifth amendment. The compulsory pro-
duction in violation of the fifth amendment was consid-
ered an unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth
amendment. For an analysis of the decision in Boyd, see
J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME
COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
49-61 (1966).
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), applied the exclu-
sionary rule to the states.
H8 See text accompanying notes 19-26 supra.
99 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)
(evidence obtained by federil officers in violation of the
fourth amendment held inadmissible in federal court);
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (state courts not
required to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment).
'00 See Appendix to Harris v. United States, 331 U.S.
145, 175-81 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Olin-
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or prohibition. 101 During the 1920's, eight out of
twelve cases upheld the admissibility of challenged
evidehce; however, as prohibition became increas-
ingly unpopular and prosecutions for violations
were disfavored, the trend was reversed. After 1930,
seizure was upheld in only two cases; in all of the
others the evidence was ruled inadmissible.1e2 This
increased use of the exclusionary rule to soften the
enforcement of prohibition also occurred in the
states, many of which had adopted their own ver-
sion of the rule for precisely that purpose.'1
3
Prohibition gave the courts their first concerted
opportunity to define searches and seizures within
the fourth amendment, and if any case can be
considered as providing the keynote to this era, it
is Carroll v. United States.'°4 The first prohibition
case to reach the Supreme Court, Carroll produced
both a majority opinion which espoused the nine-
teenth century view of probable cause and a dis-
senting opinion which called for the more stringent
requirements that soon developed. Significantly,
the majority opinion was written by Chief Justice
Taft, whose leadership dominated the Court's pol-
icies in the 1920's.'05 The dissent was authored by
Justice McReynolds, who would join in many of
the decisions excluding evidence in the thirties and
write several of them."°
Although Carroll is best known for establishing
the moving vehicle exception to the warrant re-
quirement,lr7 ChiefJustice Taft's opinion also care-
fully considered the issue of probable cause. Taft's
initial premise was that "[t]he Fourth Amendment
is to be construed in the light of what was deemed
an unreasonable search and seizure when it was
stead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), is omitted
from the Appendix because it held that a wiretap did not
constitute a search and seizure. This analysis was later
rejected in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
'0' In fact, only one search and seizure case between
1925 and 1938 was not related to liquor- Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
'02 The cases upholding seizure were Husty v. United
States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931), and Scher v. United States,
305 U.S. 251 (1938).
't3 See Canon, Is the a&cuia Rule in Failing Health?
Some New Data and a Plea Against a Preapitous Cbundrion, 62
Ky. UJ. 681, 682 n.1I (1974).
'0 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
105 ChiefJustice Taft's term ran from 1921 to 1930.
""'Justioe McReynolds wrote the majority opinions in
Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932), and Nathan-
son v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933).
107 Carroll upheld the warrantless search of a moving
vehicle based upon probable cause. 267 U.S. at 153.
tml tI at 149.
adopted, and in a manner which will conserve
public interests as well as the interests and rights of
individual citizens."1 s Turning to familiar author-
ity such as Stacey v. Emery,1°9 Taft defined probable
cause as facts and circumstances "such as to war-
rant a man of prudence and caution in believing
that an offense has been committed."10 Cases such
as Locke, The George, The Thompson and Munns v. De
Nemours were also cited, but the approach of the
Court was most clearly indicated by its reliance on
McCarthy v. De Annit. The Court in that case had
stated that the substance of all definitions of prob-
able cause is "a reasonable ground for belief in
guilt.
'1
In dissent, Justice McReynolds perceived the
same facts as establishing an illegal search incident'
to an arrest based on "mere suspicion."' 1 Respond-
ing to the majority's use of nineteenth century civil
cases for precedent, McReynolds argued that for-
feiture and tort cases should not be controlling,
particularly cases which turned on express statu-
tory provisions inapplicable to the case at hand." 3
The weakness of this position becomes apparent
when it is noted that McReynolds did not directly
attack any of the cases actually cited in the major-
ity opinion. Rather, he cited a distinguishable line
of cases which not only do not control, but also
differ significantly from the cases upon which the
majority did rely. The early cases which Justice
McReynolds listed involved statutes purporting to
authorize arrest or seizure upon opinion or "mere
suspicion," and in no way involved a determination
of the requirements for 'probable cause.11 4 Con-
versely, all of the cases cited by the majority, where
the issue was raised, did require the establishment
of probable cause and thus could serve as precedent
for the case at hand.
"9 97 U.S. 642 (1878). See also text accompanying notes
44-52 supra1
olt at 161 (quoting Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642,
645 (1878)).
"'See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S;-132, 161
(1925) (quoting McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63, 69
(1881)).
112 267 U.S. at 163 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
1 Id at 163.
"4The cases dismissed as irrelevant in the dissenting
opinion were: Taylor v. United States, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
197 (1845); Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 342
(1842); Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246 (1818);
Otis v. Watkins, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 339 (1815); United
States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398
(1814); Crowell v. McFadon, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 94
(1814). See note 75 spra which discusses the statutory
provision construed in Croiwell and Otis.
19781
EDNA F. BALL
Whether or not McReynolds' dissenting opinion
is persuasive, it is of interest because of the way it
viewed the facts. While the majority had reviewed
the facts of record and had come to the conclusion
that they were sufficient to establish probable
cause, the dissent labeled the same facts as provid-
ing "mere suspicion." Since there were some objec-
tive facts upon which the seizing officers relied and
the seizure was not based only on rumor or inchoate
hunch, the difference between the two assessments
must be based upon the different approaches to
probable cause. While the majority was satisfied
that the facts supplied a reasonable ground for
belief as required by previous decisions, the dissent
wanted something more and laid a foundation for
the coming liberal construction of fourth amend-
ment requirements.
During the 1930's, the stricter construction pre-
vailed and the previously noted increase in cases
requiring suppression resulted. Some of these cases
imposed stricter requirements to establish probable
cause. For instance, the Court in Sgro v. United
States"5 held that a strict construction of the
amendment required new evidence of probable
cause to justify reissuance of a lapsed warrant.
Similarly, United States v. Lejkowitz" 6 curbed the
scope of a search incident to arrest, and Taylor v.
United States117 invalidated a search that had been
conducted without a warrant despite ample time
to obtain one.
When in 1947 Justice Frankfurter dissented from
what he considered the retrogressive decision in
Harris v. United States,"" he attached an appendix
of search and seizure cases that had been decided
between 1914 and 1946. His purpose was to illus-
trate that "with only an occasional deviation,"' 1 9
a series of Supreme Court decisions had construed
the fourth amendment liberally to safeguard the
right of privacy. What a survey of the appendix
actually reveals is that "deviation" was common
"5 287 U.S. 206 (1932). See e.g., Rose v. United States,
45 F.2d. 459 (8th Cir. 1930) (allegations in affidavit must
be consistent with the facts later proven to establish
probable cause); Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124
(1932) (conclusory allegations insufficient).
"6 285 U.S. 452 (1932). However, the law concerning
the proper scope of a search incident to arrest remained
unsettled until Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
117 286 U.S. 1 (1932).
Il' Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 151-75 (1947)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 159.
prior to Carroll and that most of the "liberal"
construction followed in its wake."2°
World War II provided the Court a brief respite
from search and seizure cases; however, in the late
forties a second siege began. Between' 1947 and
1961, a myriad of cases addressing issues such as
scope, protected areas and standing began to fill
out the contours of the amendment.' 2 ' As many
commentators have noted, this fleshing out of
fourth amendment theory has never been done
with great consistency or logic,l '2 and not all of the
decisions in this period reflect a liberal approach.ss
However, decisions during this period generally
evinced continuing progress in that direction and




A number of cases between Boyd and Mapp ad-
dressed the issue of good faith, although never as
the actual basis for a decision and always from a
negative perspective. The basic view expressed at
the time was that the fourth amendment should
be construed to prevent an encroachment on rights
"by well-meaning but mistakenly over-zealous ex-
ecutive officers. ' 5 The usual context in which
good faith arose was that of enforcing the warrant
requirement against earnest policemen.
For example, when the Court in Johnson v. United
States12' affirmed the importance of authorizing
searches through an impartial magistrate, it rec-
120 Id. at 175-81. See also id. at 151-75 for Frankfurter's
conclusion that this decision is retrogressive.
121 See, e.g., On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747
(1952) (protected area); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S.
48 (1951) (standing); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S.
581 (1948) (scope).
'22 See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 13, at 349-52.
12 See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56
(1950) (permitting broad scope for search incident to
arrest); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
Harris and Rabinowitz were overruled by Chimel v. Cali-
fornia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See also Landynski, In Search
of Justice Black's Fourth Amendment, 45 FORIHAM L. REV.
453, 454 (1976).
5 See, e.g., Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480
(1958) (conclusory allegations of probable cause insuffi-
cient for warrant); United States v. Di.Re, 332 U.S. 581
(1948) (limiting search of persons on premises).
" 
5Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921).
In Gouled, a liberal construction meant that a warrantless
seizure of evidence through stealth was just as unreason-
able as one accomplished by force or coercion.
226 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which is not
often grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies
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ognized the danger of trusting the judgment of
officers aggressively fighting crime. Likewise, Tm-
piano v. United States"2 held that law enforcement
officers must secure and use search warrants when-
ever reasonably practicable, warning that "in their
understandable zeal to ferret out crime," police
officers are less likely to possess the neutrality nec-
essary to protect a suspect's rights. Because these
cases involved volitional failures to abide by the
warrant requirement, rather than mistaken judg-
ments as to the existence of probable cause, they
are not relevant to a discussion of a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule. The good faith
exception is designed to apply to situations in
which there is a good faith belief that constitutional
requirements are being met. It is not meant to
encompass situations likeJohnson or Trupiano, where
intentional violations are motivated by a desire to
achieve salutory law enforcement goals.
Harris v. United Statesus was another case that
hinged on the necessity of obtaining a search war-
rant. Although the Court there validated a broad
warrantless search by characterizing it as incident
to a valid arrest, in effect it really permitted a
general ransacking of the premises without judicial
authorization. Dissenting Justice Murphy pro-
tested the majority's holding, pointing out that it
had substituted the good intentions of the arresting
officer for constitutional safeguards.' 29, The inade-
quacy of such a substitute was illustrated not only
by history, but also by Harris itself which was later
overruled in Chimel v. California." However, since
the good faith exception does not purport to sub-
stitute good faith for the warrant requirement, any
more than it purports to substitute good faith for
probable cause, it does not conflict with either
Justice Murphy's position or the ultimate position
voiced in Chimel.
The only case prior to Mapp in which the issue
of good faith was considered in relation to probable
cause was Henry v. United States.131 Justice Douglas
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its pro-
tection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Id at 13-14.
'2 334 U.S. 609, 705 (1948).
"2 33 1 U.S. 145 (1947).
29 Id at 193 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
t-o 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (limiting scope of warrantless
search incident to arrest).
131 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
used that case to review the historical and deci-
sional background to the doctrine of probable
cause and to reiterate that "good faith on the part
of the arresting officers is not enough." 3 2 Since the
facts relied on to arrest the defendant were meager
and did not reasonably provide more than "mere
suspicion" of guilt, it is doubtful that the good
faith exception would even be applicable to the
Henry decision. Under the exception, a good faith
belief must also be reasonable. It is pertinent to
note, however, that even this strong opinion by
Justice Douglas did not offer any reason to ignore
good faith when an officer acts not only in good
faith, but reasonably as well.
The Exclusionary Rule Impels
This overview of pre-Mapp cases alluding to good
faith illustrates that the concept was not then being
analyzed from the perspective of the suppression
doctrine. This did not change until Mapp applied
the exclusionary rule to the states and moved the
suppression doctrine out into the streets.
Mapp was important not only because it resulted
in an increase in the volume of suppression cases,
but also because the suppression doctrine had pre-
viously'been developing in the greenhouse environ-
ment of federal prosecution. Although law enforce-
ment at the federal level was not always sophisti-
cated and well-coordinated,'33 it was somewhat
isolated from the pressures facing local patrolmen
policing high crime districts. Consequently, the
doctrine which evolved prior to Mapp was influ-
enced by the context in which it arose and was not
entirely responsive to the legitimate needs of law
enforcement at the local level. The impact of the
imposition of the exclusionary rule upon the states
was not immediately apparent. However, through-
out the sixties it became increasingly evident.
Much of the doctrinal reassessment of the 1970's
has been an attempt to alleviate the pressures on
the criminal justice system created by coupling a
liberal interpretation of the fourth amendment
with an expansive application of the exclusionary
rule. However, the Warren Court itself began a
modest accommodation to the needs of law enforce-
ment as early as the mid-1960's. One of its steps
which affected the law concerning probable cause
and good faith- was its confirmation of the prefer-
enqe to be granted to searches under warrants.
'32 Id at 100-02.
'33 See, e.g., Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,
282 U.S. 344 (1931).
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When a challenged search was based on a warrant,
reviewing courts were entitled to accept evidence
of a less judicially competent or persuasive char-
acter than would have justified a search without a
warrant.34 This preference accorded to warrants
was defended as an encouragement to officers to
resort to warrants, but the acknowledgment of
police good faith is evident.ss It was explicitly
stated in United States v. Ventrescas13 that the Court
was equally concerned with upholding the actions
of law enforcement officers who consistentiy fol-
lowed the proper constitutional course.
The practical result of this philosophy is to val-
idate seizures under doubtful warrants and to ad-
mit evidence which might well have been excluded
had there been no warrant. This is conceptually
similar to applying a good faith exception to sei-
zures based upon a warrant which is subsequently
held invalid, and it is functionally identical. The
chief objection to this preference is the one voiced
by Justice Douglas in his dissent to Ventresca. The
Constitution also binds magistrates and their ac-
tions are reviewable for violations as well. 3 7
The issue raised by Justice Douglas also raises
questions about treating police action based upon
good faith reliance on a defective warrant as a
technical violation of the fourth amendment. In
such cases, not merely the good faith of the officer
is involved, but also the good faith of the magis-
trate. Given the preference already granted to war-
rants under Ventresca, it is arguably departing much
too far from the spirit of the amendment to permit
what amounts to a second indulgence concerning
its requirements. Certainly, it may be criticized as
ignoring the history of warrants that resulted in an
absolute requirement in the Constitution that "no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause."
In his noted essay on search, seizure and surveil-
lance, Professor Taylor reviewed the eighteenth
century history leading to the fourth amendment
and concluded that the amendment was prompted
'3' See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109-12
(1965); Aquilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964); Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1960).
"3 Cf Franks v. Delaware, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2685 (1978)
(Franks reaffirmed the presumption of validity of the
affidavit supporting the search warrant and predicated
the right to a hearing upon a substantial preliminary
showing that a false statement in the affidavit was in-
cluded deliberately or with reckless disregard for the
truth. Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake were
held to be insufficient to trigger a hearing).
' 380 U.S. at 111-12.
'37 Id. at 117 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
not by a general fear of unreasonable searches, but
by a specific concern about overreaching war-
rants.is 8 Whether or not one accepts his further
conclusions that the framers of the Constitution
"were not at all concerned about searches without
warrants"' 39 or his attendant views regarding the
range of reasonable warrantless searches, his assess-
ment that the abuse of warrants was particularly
feared must be recognized as sound.1
40
In light of this, to except searches from the
exclusionary rule because of an officer's good faith
reliance on a defective warrant is to jeopardize a
strict tenet of the amendment. In direct violation
of the Constitution, warrants could issue without
probable cause, and negligent or partial magis-
trates could rely upon the good faith of executing
officers to negate the deficiency. 4 1 Warrants are
already afforded a "good faith test" at the magis-
trate level since under Ventresca, they are reviewed
with a generous eye to the reasonableness of the
magistrate's factual evaluation. An added good
faith exception can be challenged as unnecessary
as well as dangerous. The danger alone constitutes
sufficient reason to reassess the inclusion of good
faith reliance on defective warrants as a technical
violation of the amendment. 42
Another major concession of the Warren Court
to the realities of local law enforcement was Terry
v. Ohio.'4 With Terry, the Court partially back-
tracked from the stringent requirements of proba-
ble cause to a more flexible reasonableness stan-
dard which balanced the justification against the
intrusion.' 44 Besides recognizing the limited useful-
13 8 See T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 24-41 (1969).
'
3 9 Id. at 43.
'40 For a thoughtful appraisal of Taylor's analysis
which accepts his assessment of history, but not his
ultimate conclusions concerning the fourth amendment,
see Amsterdam, supra note 13, at 409-15.
141 Although modem search and seizure law assumes
the neutrality of magistrates, historically magistrates were
politically influenced and wielded executive as well as
judicial power. For "an historical look at magisterial
neutrality and the general warrant," see Farrar, Aspects
of Police Search and Seizure Without Warrant in England and
the United States, 29 U. MIAMI L. REv. 491,550-58 (1975).
142 A good faith arrest based upon a warrant which is
later invalidated is characterized as a "technical viola-
tion" by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion to
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611 (1975) (Powell, J.
concurring).
,43 92 U.S. 1 (1968).
1"4 Id. at 20-27. For comprehensive discussion of the
meaning of Terry, see LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the
[Vol0. 69
GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
ness of the exclusionary rule,t 4 the opinion held
that facts which do not meet the modern probable
cause test might nonetheless be sufficient to justify
a limited search and seizure that would be reason-
able under the fourth amendment. Where specific
and articulable facts, judged against an objective
standard, warranted a reasonable man in the belief
that a limited intrusion was appropriate, a stop
and frisk was sanctioned.' 46 This was not a return
to the old standard under which a reasonable
suspicion equalled probable cause, but it was a
formula delineating reasonable suspicion as a con-
stitutional basis for a limited invasion of privacy.
When the Court abolished the "silver platter
doctrine" in Elkins v. United States,1 47 it surmised
that it could not have been forseen that such a rule
would engender practical difficulties in an era of
expanding federal criminal jurisdiction. Much the
same thing could have been said concerning the
effects of the suppression doctrine, and Terry sought
to alleviate some of the practical difficulties of
enforcing the law within the Fourth Amendment.
However, because Terry was restricted to a narrow
set of circumstances, it was only partially successful
in moderating the double burden of a liberal fourth
amendment working in tandem with the exclusion-
ary rule. Reaction against the exclusionary rule
continued to mount and, ultimately, it was left to
the Burger Court to respond by curbing the appli-
cability of the rule. One method of accomplishing
this was by expanding the list of exigent circum-
stances which would permit warrantless searches."4
Another method was the establishment of the de-
terrence rationale as the exclusive justification for
suppression. 149 This rationale would require proof
that the exclusion of illegally seized evidence would
deter future illegal seizures, before evidence would
be suppressed. However, a more workable ration-
ale, if adopted, would be the good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule.
Constitution" Tery, Sibron, Peters, and Bqond, 67 MiC-. L
REv. 39 (1968).
'45 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 13-14.
146,r at 20-22.
,47 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
,48 Se Lewis, Justice Stewart and Fourth Amendment Prob-
able Cause: "Swing Voter" or Partciant in a "New Major-
i'?, 22 Loy. L REv. 713, 717 & n.29 (1976).
" Sre text accompanying notes 159-73 infra- "Tlhe
rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police
conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and
seizures." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347
(1974).
GOOD FAITH AND THE RruRN TO "REASONABLE-
NESS"
It has been shown that since early in the nation's
history not every violation of the fourth amend-
ment has resulted in a remedy or sanction. In civil
cases, good faith has long had an effect upon the
imposition of sanctions for official action taken
without probable cause. This effect continues to-
day. A modern example is the federal civil rights
section 1983 action which was specifically designed
to provide a federal cause of action for violations
of constitutional rights by state officers.so The
section 1983 action has been held applicable to
cases concerning illegal searches and seizures.1
5 1
Consistent with early precedent, the action may be
defeated by a showing of good faith.152
For reasons previously discussed, criminal cases
concerned with the relationship between good faith
and the fourth amendment did not arise during
the nineteeth century.15 3 Thereafter, the suppres-
sion doctrine and expanded criminal jurisdiction
made the issue a logical one; however, there was
no serious consideration of the effect of good faith
until the 1970's.
There are several possible explanations for this
apparent judicial oversight. The first is that when-
ever the Court contemplated the issue of good
faith, it asked the wrong question. The question
that it posed was the one that was discussed in
Henry v. United States and Beck v. Ohio: whether good
faith on the part of the arresting officer was suffi-
cient to constitute probable cause.'" The resound-
ing and proper answer to this question is "no".5
Certainly, good faith is not an acceptable substitute
for facts and circumstances warranting "an officer's
belief. However, the correct question would have
been whether, given an absence of probable cause,
good faith should affect the decision to suppress.




' See Monroe i. Pape, 365 U.S. 167.
2 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Monaghan,
Forewrc- Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1,
41 (1975). See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972); QGeller, supra note 1, at
693-94.
-
3 See text accompanying notes 19-25 supra
'
54 See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1965); Henry v.
United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959).
uZ "If subjective good faith alone were the test, the
protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate,
and the people would be 'secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects,' only in the discretion of the police."
Beck v. Ohio, 379 US. 89,97 (1965).
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As the review of pre-Mapp cases illustrated, this
was never discussed.' 56
A second explanation for the oversight is that
the Court was not yet motivated to attempt to
curtail the exclusionary rule. As a relatively new
doctrine and one that was restricted to the federal
arena, it had not yet revealed its limitations. On
the contrary, particularly during the last years of
prohibition, suppression was a useful tool which
promoted a popular policy. It was not until the
post-Mapp era that the doctrine's weaknesses be-
came apparent.
These two explanations were probably respon-
sible for the initial neglect of good faith. A third
explanation, though, emerges as the likely reason
for continued inattention to the doctrine. The the-
oretical basis for the exclusionary rule has been
mutable and elusive almost since the rule's concep-
tion.1 57 Constitutional scholars continue to explore
its theoretical underpinningssas The viability of a
good faith exception is greatly influenced by this
theoretical basis. If exclusion is considered a con-
stitutional right, the Court would have a constitu-
tional duty to uphold it and could not dispense
with it simply because of good faith. For that
reason, it was important for the Court to establish
another rationale for exclusion prior to proposing
a good faith exception.
In United States v. Calandra," the Court estab-
lished a rationale which has been integral to both
curbing the application of the exclusionary rule
and legitimizing the emerging good faith doctrine.
The Calandra Court held that witnesses before a
grand jury may not refuse to answer questions
based on evidence obtained from unlawful search
and seizure. t6° This decision was based on a deter-
156 See, text accompanying notes 126-32.
'57 Among the theories relied upon are deterrence,
judicial integrity, a fourth amendment constitutional
right and a combined fourth and fifth amendment con-
stitutional right.
158 See, e.g., Schrock and Welsh, Up from Calandra: The
Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L.
REv. 251 (1974). This article argues that there are two
personal constitutional rights to exclusion, one based on
the fourth amendment and one based on due process. A
due process basis for exclusion is also argued in Sunder-
land, The Exclusionary Rule: A Requirement of Constitutional
Principle, 69J. CRiM. L. & C. 141 (1978).
5 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
"
6
o Id. The Supreme Court, however, reached a differ-
ent result in applying the federal wiretap statute, Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20. In Gelbard v. United
States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972), the Supreme Court held that
a grand jury witness who has refused to testify about
mination that the exclusionary rule "is a judicially
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect, rather than a personal constitutional right
of the party aggrieved. "1 6 Selectively gleaning sup-
portive ideas from prior cases while omitting con-
trary authority,t 62 the opinion elevated deterrence
to prime importance and refused to accept the
dissent's position that the exclusionary rule is that
"part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment's lim-
itation" and founded on the imperative ofjudicial
integrity. 63 While the dissent viewed deterrence as
"at best only a hoped for effect of the rule" and
thus highlighted other historical objectives of ex-
clusion,564 the majority refused to apply the rule
where the deterrent goal would not be significantly
furthered.lss
To the extent that this exaltation of the deter-
rence rationale is accepted, it destroys the reason
for suppression whenever the sanction cannot be
demonstrated to have a least potential deterrent
effect. 166 Therefore, Calandra laid the basis for sub-
sequent curtailment of the exclusionary rule. Since
situations involving good faith violations rarely
lend themselves to deterrence, they naturally pro-
vide a category of cases in which suppression is
arguably inappropriate.
16
Although it is important for the proposed excep-
tion to establish deterrence as the basis for the
exclusionary rule, doing so raises another consti-
tutional problem. If the exclusionary rule is not a
constitutional right, there is some question as to
intercepted communications or in response to questions
based on intercepted communications may assert the
illegality of the wiretap as a defense to a contempt charge.
See also 68 J. CRIM. L. & C. 505 (1977).
16' 414 U.S. at 348.
:62 Compare iL at 347 with Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222.
63 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 360 (1974)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
'64 Id. at 355-67.
165 Id. at 349-52 (Opinion of the Court).
'66 Empirical studies have failed either to prove or
disprove the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule. See,
e.g., Nagel, Testing the Effects of Excluding Illegally Seized
Evidence, 1965 Wisc. L. REv. 283; Oaks, Studying the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHt. L. REv.
665 (1970); Spiotto, An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary
Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STuDis 243 (1973).
167 Although retroactivity cases involve other consid-
erations as well, deterrence is also a prominent factor in
their decision. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 359-60 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Linldetter
v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965).
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whether it may be imposed on the states as a
remedial rule.168 In extending the exclusionary rule
to the states, Mapp v. Ohio held that as a matter of
constitutional law, a state court must suppress
evidence seized as a result of violation of the fourth
and fourteenth amendments. 6 Both deterrence
and judicial integrity were used as justifications for
the holding1 70 however, the authority for imposing
the rule on the states was that it was an indispen-
sable part of the fourth amendment. If this is not
true and the rule is ajudicially-fashioned remedial
device, it may be argued that the states should be
free to substitute their own remedies.'
72
In summary, if the exclusionary rule is constitu-
tionally mandated, it could not be disregarded on
occasions when it does not further deterrent goals.
Exclusion would be required in any case in which
there had been a violation of constitutional rights,
including those cases involving good faith viola-
tions. If, however, the rule is not part of a consti-
tutional right, there would be no constituti6nal
obstacle to adding an exception to the judicially-
created remedy. There might then be a question as
to the authority for imposing the exclusionary rule
on the states; however, where the rule is unques-
tionably validly imposed, as in the federal courts,
the good faith exception would be constitutionally
sound.173
The Modem Good Faith Doctrine
If it is assumed that the exclusion of evidence is
not a constitutional right, the policy considerations
governing whether or not there should be a good
faith exception demand consideration. 74 The basic
68 See Monaghan supra note 152 at 2-6.
t6 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). It should be remembered
that Mapp was a plurality opinion, joined by only four
members of the Court. Justice Black concurred in the
result, but based upon his unique view of the relationship
between the fourth and fifth amendments. See id. at
661-62 (Black, J., concurring).
-Id. at 658-59.
171 Id. at 655-57.
'72 See Monaghan supra note 152 at 2-6. See also Dellin-
ger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85
HARv. L. REv. 1532, 1561 (1972).
' It has been suggested that even if exclusion is not a
constitutional right the Court might nonetheless have a
common law power to implement federally guaranteed
rights. See Monaghan, supra note 152, at 10-20. Mon-
aghan also sees little reason why there should not be a
good faith defense to the exclusionary rule, at least where
police conduct is not at issue, particularly since good
faith is a recognized defense to § 1983 actions. It at 41.
174 It is recognized that all of the Court's decisions are
inherently statements ofjudicial policy, and that deter-
premises supporting the evolving good faith doc-
trine have been developed in four Supreme Court
decisions issued subsequent to Calandra.1 75
The relationship between good faith and the
deterrence rationale was initially delineated in
Michigan v. Tucker,176 a fifth amendment case that
admitted the fruits of a Miranda violation. In Tucker,
the Court stated that prior to penalizing police
error by suppression of evidence, it would consider
whether exclusion would serve a valid and useful
purpose.'7 Since the deterrent goal of the exclu-
sionary rule is to instill a greater degree of care in
officers who have violated a defendant's rights
through willful or negligent conduct, it was deter-
mined that this purpose would not be served where
the officers had acted in complete good faith.17
The decision to admit the evidence in Tucker
relied on several factors besides good faith, includ-
ing the voluntariness of the defendant's state-
ments 9 and the reliability of the derivative evi-
dence.18° And, as suggested by the concurring opin-
ion, the decision possibly could have rested upon
minations of what constitute constitutional rights are
equally influenced by policy considerations. As Justice
White once observed:
[Tihe Court has not discovered or found the law in
making today's decision, nor has it derived it from
some irrefutable sources; what it has done is to make
new law and new public policy in much the same
way that it has in the course of interpreting other
great'clauses of the Constitution. This is what the
Court historically has done. Indeed, it is what it
must do and will continue to do until and unless
there is some fundamental change in the constitu-
tional distribution of governmental powers.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 531 (1966) (White, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted).
'7SThe facts of Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560
(1971), which preceded Calandra, potentially could have
raised the issue of a good faith exception; however,
neither Justice Powell nor Justice Rehnquist had as yet
been appointed to the court, and the idea was not even
suggested.
S76See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974). Al-
though the application of a good faith exception to
violations of the fifth amendment raises issues beyond the
scope of this article, this case has contributed to the
overall good faith rationale and will be discussed for that
limited reason.
The officer's error in Tucker was a failure to give a
complete Miranda warning at an interrogation which took
place prior to the Miranda decision. For the requirements
under Miranda, see 384 U.S. 436.
'7 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,446 (1974).
'
178 Id. at 447.
79 It at 444-45.
8o Id at 448-49.
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retroactivity principles instead.18 ' However, the
opinion in Tucker was nonetheless significant, be-
cause it evidenced the new willingness of some
members of the court to consider the nature of the
illegality when determining the applicability of the
exclusionary rule.'
82
The next major decision highlighting the issue
of good faith was Peltier v. United States.'83 Peltier has
already been discussed to some extent, 84 its contri-
butions to the development of the good faith doc-
trine warrant further exploration. Although the
case was decided on retroactivity grounds, the
Court did examine good faith in light of both the
deterrence rationale and the imperative of judicial
integrity. First, the Court looked at prior retroac-
tivity cases and interpreted them as establishing
that if officers reasonably believed in good faith
that their conduct was in accordance with existing
law, the imperative of judicial integrity would not
be offended if decisions subsequent to the seizure
held that their conduct was unconstitutional.""
The courts would not be "accomplices in the willful
disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to
uphold" where no willful disobedience existed.'86
Next, turning to the deterrence rationale, the
Peltier Court maintained that evidence obtained
from a search should be suppressed only if the
seizing officers "had knowledge or may be properly
charged with knowledge that the search was un-
constitutional.' 87 This was simply a reiteration of
Tucker's willful or negligent conduct criterion ap-
plied to violations of the fourth amendment. 8
9
Peltier thus judged good faith in relation to both
181 Id. at 453-59 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also
Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968) (exclusionary rule
given prospective application based upon good faith
reliance on overruled decision).
'82 Prior to Tucker, the ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraign-
ment Procedure, § 290.2 (Official Draft, 1975) recom-
mended that there should be suppression only where the
violation was "substantial." One factor to be considered
in determining whether the violation was substantial was
the extent to which the violation was willful.
The Bentsen Bill, proposed in 1972, similarly sought
to limit the application of the exclusionary rule to sub-
stantial violations. S. 2657, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
The American Bar Association went on record as
opposed to this bill, and the legislation was never enacted.
See 12 CRIM. L. REp. (BNA) 2429-31 (1973).
'83 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
'8 See text accompanying notes 76-89.
'85 Peltier v. United States, 422 U.S. 531, 535-38
(1975).
186 Id at 536 (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 223).
'8 Pettier, 422 U.S. at 542.
'
8 Id. at 539 (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447.
deterrence and judicial integrity, and found that
neither competing interest was at odds- with the
good faith rationale.
A limited guide to the kinds of police conduct
which may be considered good faith violations, was
presented in Justice Powell's concurring opinion to
Brown v. Ilinois.'89 Using a sliding scale, Powell
placed flagrantly abusive violations at one extreme
and "technical" violations on the other.'9g Flagrant
violations included pretext arrests or unnecessarily
intrusive invasions of personal privacy.' Techni-
cal violations included arrests based on good faith
reliance on a warrant later invalidated and arrests
pursuant to a statute subsequently declared uncon-
stitutional.' 92
In cases of flagrant violation, Powell accepted
that both deterrent goals and the mandate to
preserve judicial integrity would demand that the
fruits of official misconduct be excluded.'93 How-
ever, in cases involving technical violations, neither
of those factors justified the suppression of reliable
and probative evidence.1
4
Taken together, these opinions in Tucker, Peltier
and Brown accept deterrence as the primary reason
for exclusion, argue that neither deterrence nor
judicial integrity warrant exclusion in cases involv-
ing good faith violations, and provide examples of
technical violations to which a good faith exception
would apply. All of this doctrinal development
occurred within the first eighteen months following
Calandra, and all of it was promulgated in opinions
authored by either Justice Powell or Justice Rehn-
quist.'95 Almost exactly one year later, the next
major contributions to the doctrine of good faith
were provided in connection with Stone v. Powetl.
However, this time the advocates of the doctrine
were Chief Justice Burger and Justice White.
"9 422 U.S. 590, 606-16 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring
in part). Brown rejected a per se rule that Miranda warn-
ings automatically purged the taint of a defendant's
illegal arrest and held that two inculpatory statements
were inadmissible.
'90 Id. at 610. A similar idea was proposed in Wright,
supra note 3, at 744-45.
91 Id. at 611.
192 Id.
'93 Id "In such cases the deterrent value of the exclu-
sionary rule is most likely to be effective, and the corre-
sponding mandate to preserve judicial integrity.., most
clearly demands that the fruits of official misconduct be
denied." Id (Citations omitted).
4 id at 612.
'
95 Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinions in
both Tucker and Peltier; Justice Powell wrote the concur-
ring opinion in Brown.
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The issue of good faith was raised by the facts in
Stone v. Powell, but it was not a basis for the Court's
decision.196 Instead, the issue appeared promi-
nantly in both Chief justice Burger's concurring
opinion and Justice White's dissent.
Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion ac-
tually added little other than moral support to the
proposed good faith exception. Its main theme was
that the cost of exclusion is far too high to justify
its use when its deterrent effect is unproven. 97 The
exclusion of reliable, probative evidence from the
fact-finding process, Burger believed to be a "sense-
less obstacle to arriving at truth in many criminal
trials," particularly those involving evidence seized
in good faith.'96 He noted that the rule is presently
applied indiscriminately to all types of fourth
amendment violations 99 and suggested that it
would be wiser either to abolish the rule entirely or
to limit its scope to egregious bad faith conduct." °
Burger's opinion was basically a general attack
on the exclusionary rule using good faith violations
as an example of the excessive use of the "Dracon-
ian, discredited device in its present absolutist
form". 0 Burger did, however, make a minor con-
tribution to the good faith doctrine by dividing
good faith violations into the two subcategories
used throughout this article. Although he did not
proceed to analyze the two categories, he did seem
to recognize the conceptual difference between
good faith mistakes and technical violations.
202
This difference was more clearly illustrated in the
dissenting opinion ofJustice White.
Prior to justice White's dissent in Stone, opinions
discussing good faith had concentrated upon tech-
nical violations such as conduct predicated upon
an invalid statute.' While White's dissent also
examined technical violations,204 he did recognize
196 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Powell
was arrested pursuant to an ordinance which was later
held unconstitutional. In the companion case of Wolff v.
Rice, evidence had been seized pursuant to a wanrant
which was subsequently invalidated.
19See id at 496-502 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
98Id at 501-02, (quoting justice Whites dissent, 428
U.S. at 538 (White, J., dissenting)).
'9 428 U.S. at 499, 501 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
2I0 d at 501. Chief Justice Burger expressed similar
ideas when he was still ajudge of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See Burger, Who
Will Watch the Watchmam, 14 AM. U. L Ray. 1 (1964).
21428 U.S. at 500 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
=Id at 499.
See, e.g., Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611 (1975)
(Powell, J., concurring).
SSee text accompanying notes 95-96.
a second type of good- faith violation-good faith
mistake. The examples of good faith mistake given
by White involved officers making difficult judg-
ments concerning the existence of probable cause
based on available facts.2 5 Thus, the good faith
exception which White proposed imposed two re-
quirements on both technical violations and good
faith mistakes: (1) a good faith belief that the
conduct was legal, and (2) reasonable grounds for
that belief.2 6
Unlike technical violations always involving au-
thoritative pronouncements which establish a rea-
sonable basis for believing that there is probable
cause, good faith mistakes involvejudgmental error
which may or may not have been reasonable. For
instance, a policeman may possess undisputed facts
concerning a suspect and be convinced by those
facts that he has probable cause to arrest. Those
facts may indeed overwhelmingly establish proba-
ble cause, and if that is so, the arrest will not be
vulnerable to challenge. However, they might also
be so weak that no reasonable officer would ever
view them as.establishing probable cause. In such
cases, no amount of good faith on the part of the
officer would be sufficient to meet the second re-
quirement of the good faith exception.
The cases to which the good faith exception
would apply lie somewhere between these two
extremes. They include situations where the officer
acted as a reasonable officer would and should act
in similar circumstances, but where courts have
ultimately determined that in their view the officer
was mistaken.207 justice White argued that in such
cases the exclusion of evidence will have no deter-
rent effect, because officers doing their duty will
act the same way in similar future cases.a Given
that this is so, the only consequence of suppression
will be the exclusion of truth from the fact-finding
process.20 This result is posited as no more appro-
priate in cases of good faith mistake than it is in
cases of technical violation.
Interestingly, Justice White also contrasted the
treatment of good faith in criminal suppression
cases with that in civil damage cases. He pointed
out that an officer is excused from civil liability
both when he has acted under a statute which he
reasonably believed to be valid but which was later
2 5 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538-39 (White,
J. dissenting).
21, at 53&
m7 rd at 539-40.
2M Id at 540.
20 r
held unconstitutional, and when he has mistakenly
but reasonably believed that he had probable cause
for an arrest.10 In Justice White's view, it makes
little sense to exclude reliable and probative evi-
dence when the defendant is not even entitled to
compensation for invasion of his privacy.21 1 Al-
though he did not harken back to nineteenth cen-
tury civil precedent, he might very well have done
SO.
The summarize, the basic position of those who
support the good faith doctrine is that the exclu-
sionary rule excludes reliable, probative evidence
from the judicial fact-finding process, and thus
hampers the determination of truth. Because exclu-
sion is not a constitutional right, it can and should
be employed only where its underlying rationales
are served. In cases involving good faith violations,
neither deterrence nor the imperative of judicial
integrity is positively affected by exclusion. There-
fore, a good faith exception should apply to all
cases involving good faith mistakes or technical
violations.
2 12
Opponents of the good faith exception need not
uniformly assert that the exclusionary rule is a
constitutional right. However, those who do may
make the obvious threshold argument that the
Court cannot ignore a constitutional right simply
because it does not advance certain judicial or
societal goals. Constitutional rights must usually
be respected even where they conflict with other
important societal needs. Consequently, a "prag-
matic analysis" of the exclusionary rule's usefulness
is both inappropriate and unpersuasive given that
there are paramount individual claims to enforce-.
ment.
2 13
For the present, however, the Supreme Court
has rejected the theory of constitutional right, and
those who would successfully oppose the good faith
exception must grapple with it from a position
dictated by the deterrence rationale. Justice Bren-
nan, who continues to view the rule as a right,214
2 10 Id. at 541.
211 Id. at 541-42.
212 Compare the ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Pro-
cedures, § 290.2 (Proposed Official Draft, 1975) which
proposes that factors such as willfulness and deterrent
effect be considered in determining whether a violation
will be deemed substantial and therefore require the
suppression of resultant evidence.
213 See Schrock and Welsh, supra note 158, at 272-81.
Justice Powell referred to the "pragmatic analysis of the
exclusionary rule's usefulness" in Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 488 (1976). But see Kaplan, The Limits of the
Exclusionar'Rule, 26 STAN. L. Rav. 1027, 1032-35 (1974).
214 See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 509 (1976)
has done this in his dissent to Peltier v. United
States.
2 15
In Peltier, Justice Brennan principally argued
that the good faith rationale wrongly assumes that
the exclusionary rule seeks to deter by punishment
or threat of punishment. 216 Instead, according to
Brennan, the purpose of the rule is to deter "by
removing the incentives to disregard it." 217 When-
ever illegal evidence is used in court it creates an
incentive in officers to attempt to evade constitu-
tional requirements. If a law is ambiguous and
could reasonably be read to validate a seizure,
officers will be encouraged to opt for the interpre-
tation which may compromise. fourth amendment
rights.21 8 Although Justice Brennan did not use, an
example of good faith mistake, there would also be
incentive to assume probable cause where the sup-
porting facts were marginal. Consequently, he be-
lieved that the suppression of evidence seized in
good faith could have more than minimal deterrent
effect, because it would remove the incentive to
take chances with a suspect's rights in the many
situations where probable cause is not clear.
Justice Brennan's argument leads logically to the
conclusion that the adoption of a good faith excep-
tion will tend to destroy actual good faith in those
situations where violations are now mainly inno-
cent. Because good faith must ultimately bejudged
by an objective standard, officers who believe they
can meet the objective criteria will be encouraged
to attempt the seizure even when they do not
believe that there is probable cause. This was
distressing to Justice Brennan; however, it may not
distress those members of the Court who have
retreated from the strict definition of probable
cause. Because good faith, either actual or judi-
cially determined, must be coupled with a reason-
able basis for believing that there is probable cause,
even cases lacking actual good faith will meet the
reasonableness test. If the true purpose, or even
true result, of good faith exception is to reestablish
a reasonableness test for probable cause, an incen-
(Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 360 (1974).
21, Justice Brennan does not here oppose the good faith
exception per se, because none was applied in Peltier.
However, he did see that the good faith rationale in
Peltier could be expanded beyond retroactivity cases. See
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 551 (1975) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
26 Id. at 556.217 Id. at 557, quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217.
2,8 422 U.S. at 559.
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tive to utilize that reasonableness test will not
dissuade its proponents.
General criticisms leveled by Justice Brennan at
the good faith exception are that it will end the
exclusionary rule as it is now known,219 that it will
stop the judicial development of fourth amend-
ment rights, ° and that it will require burdensome
case by case analysis.22' In making the first charge,
Justice Brennan has accurately assessed the good
faith exception as an indirect method of curtailing
the exclusionary rule. However, to use this argu-
ment seems merely to express a preferred judicial
policy. It does not amount to reasoning likely to
persuade those who have adopted a different pol-
icy, and it does not directly refute that policy.
There is also some merit to Brennan's second
concern. Assuredly, a good faith doctrine would
affect the development of fourth amendment law.
However, it is perhaps overly pessimistic to fear
that the law will "stop dead in its tracks." More-
over, a mere lack of clear precedent on identical
facts would not automatically require denial of
motions to suppress.222 In the absence of probable
cause, an officer would in each case have to estab-
lish both a good faith belief and a reasonable basis
for that belief. Although reliance on precedent
might help establish both the belief and the basis,
the absence of precedent "on all fours" would not
in itself save unreasonable conduct. As Justice
Rehnquist suggested in his response to Justice
Brennan's dissent, it is unlikely that good faith will
both stop judicial development by promoting
wholesale automatic denials of suppression and
increase the present burdens on the courts.= Al-
though some increased burden is likely, it is impos-
sible to predict its extent in advance.
The final point which Justice Brennan raised is
that good faith will require a probing of the sub-
jective knowledge of the seizing officer.2 ' Because
the good faith doctrine proposes an objective test
of good faith which parallels that used in civil cases
judging good faith or malice, the questions posed
by Justice Brennan are easily answered.2
The first question considers what would happen
under the good faith doctrine if an officer believed
2S9 Id. at 551.
f Id. at 554.
22 Id. at 560-61.
2m Brennan predicts this in his dissent. See Peltier, 422
U.S. at 554 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
M Id at 542-43 n.13 (Opinion of the Court).
224 See id. at 553, 560-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22' The questions were posed in Justice Brennan's dis-
sent Pettier.
a search to be unconstitutional when it was not.
The answer is that the situation would remain as
it is now in criminal cases and as it has been
historically in malicious prosecution cases. The
search would be considered legal because probable
cause existed, and no sanction would be applied.226
Second, it is asked what would happen if a
search was unconstitutional and was believed to be
unconstitutional, although it might reasonably
have been believed to be based upon probable
cause. Under the good faith exception, evidence
would be suppressed as illegal unless the officer
could establish both a good faith belief and a rea-
sonable basis for that belief.227 Where he could not
establish the first requirement, the second alone
would not be sufficient. Consequently, in this sit-
uation the good faith exception would not be
applied.
Justice Brennan's second question assumes that
the actual lack of good faith on the part of the
searching officer would somehow be known to the
court. In most cases where the facts could reason-
ably support a good faith belief, the court is un-
likely to have anything before it other than the
officer's assurance that he was convinced he had
probable cause.m Such testimony, whether truth-
ful or perjured, is almost impossible to refute.
Consequently, the most important criterion for use
of the good faith test will be the reasonableness of
the officer's belief when judged on the objective
facts.
The Return to Reasonableness
Proponents of the good faith exception have
urged that it is acceptable because it does not
conflict with the underlying purposes of the exclu-
sionary rule. Critics have argued not only that it
does conflict with the purposes of exclusion, but
also that it may lead to the total demise of the rule.
Both of these approaches are flawed. They tend to
lose sight of the fourth amendment. The good faith
doctrine should not be judged by its effect on the
exclusionary rule but by its effect upon the stan-
dards which define when citizens will be protected
against governmental intrusion. To the extent that
probable cause is the key to fourth amendment
protections, the good faith exception diminishes
See text accompanying note 63.
27See Stone, 428 U.S. at 538 (White, J., dissenting).
The exclusionary rule already fosters false testimony
by police officers. See Oaks, supra note 166, at 739-42. For
additional discussion of the problem of police perjury, see
Savilla, The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjuly, 11 SAN
DiEo L. REv. 839 (1974).
the-liberality of the fourth amendment by reinsti-
tuting the reasonableness standard of the nine-
teenth century.
This happens because the practical result of the
good faith exception is no different than the result
of a seizure based upon probable cause. Where
probable cause supports a search and seizure, there
is no imposition of either civil remedy or exclusion-
ary sanction. Likewise, where a good faith excep-
tion is appfied, there will be neither civil relief nor
suppression. Thus, in cases involving good faith,
the requirements of the good faith exception re-
place the requirement of probable cause as the
determinative test for admissibility or civil remedy.
In other words, what is required is no longer "prob-
able cause" as presently defined, but instead "a
reasonable ground for belief."
In cases of technical violation, both good faith
and its reasonable basis are provided almost by
definition. The officer's conduct is predicated upon
a statute, decision or warrant upon which he was
expected to rely and in most cases actually did rely.
Good faith mistakes require stricter scrutiny under
the objective standard. However, once it is deter-
mined that the officer's mistaken judgment was
grounded in a reasonable basis, it will be the rare
case in which the exception will not be applied.?
In most cases, both technical violations and good
faith mistakes will result in the court's proceeding
as though probable cause existed whenever it finds
a reasonable ground for belief.
The adoption of the good faith exception would
correspondingly alter the true extent of fourth
amendment protections. Those who oppose the
exception might well argue that it unconstitution-
ally subverts the probable cause requirement in
any case in which it is applied. However, as has
been shown throughout this article, there is histor-
ical and decisional support not only for legally
acknowledging good faith, but also for defining the
fourth amendment's probable cause requirement
in terms of a reasonableness standard. Probable
cause has been viewed differently in the past, and
with a change in judicial policy, it could be viewed
that way again. It would not be surprising to see
the present Supreme Court, which has already
retreated from an expansive treatment of the fourth
amendment, adopt this further measure.
22
' Occasionally, an officer will either demonstrate or
admit to bad faith. In those cases, the exception would
not be applied. See text accompanying notes 224-28 supra.
CONCLUSION
To acknowledge that the good faith exception is
historically and conceptually sound is not to ad-
vocate its adoption. It may be that the good faith
exception demands a policy commitment that
should not be made at this point in the twentieth
century.
As a partial return to the "crime control" model
of criminal process, good faith could increase the
efficiency of the process by protecting the use of
probative evidence.23° At the same time, however,
it might also offend the notions of due process
which have taken root in the national conscious-
ness. Although the public is presently impatient
with what it views as excessive solicitude for the
rights of criminals, it is likely to react with a "sense
of injustice" to doctrines which jeopardize the
rights of innocent and guilty alike.231 Of more
direct practical importance is the fact that adop-
tion of the good faith exception might encourage
law enforcers to take less care to respect the rights
of suspects. One of the exclusionary rule's few
conceded accomplishments is that it has increased
police training and awareness about their respon-
sibilities. m A signal from the Court that it is
abating its aggressive enforcement of fourth
amendment requirements is apt to evoke a consist-
ent reslponse from the police.=s
It also may be argued that the twentieth century
needs a more demanding definition of probable
cause than existed in the nineteenth century. Ur-
banization, pervasive governmental regulation and
modem technology have already combined tojeop-
o The "crime control" model was posed by Herbert
Packer as an alternative approach to the criminal process.
It presumes that the repression of criminal conduct is the
most important function to be performed by the criminal
process, and it emphasizes the efficient determination of
guilt and disposition of criminals. The alternative is the
"due process" model, which emphasizes protection of the
accused through an adversarial process which places
duties and restrictions upon the government. See H.
PACKER, THE LiMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANarION 149-246
(1968).
The exclusionary rule is regarded as antithetical to the
crime control model. Id at 177-78.
" Id. at 239-40.
m See, e.g., LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through
the Exclusionary Rule (pt. 1), 30 Mo. L. REv. 391, 395-96
(1965); (pt. 2) 566 and passim; Oaks, supra note 166, at
708; Spiotto, supra note 166, at 274-75.
' Cf Goldberg, Foreword-The Burger Court 1971 Term:
One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward?, 63 J. Crtm. L. C.
& P. S. 465 (1972) (effect of Supreme Court action on
the moral tone of the country).
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ardize what little privacy the average citizen re-
tains. A strict requirement of probable cause may
be necessary to continue to protect the privacy
which remains.
On the other hand, urbanization, the sophisti-
cation of modem crime and our increased reliance
upon the government to guarantee our safety have
combined to confront modern law enforcers with
problems unimagined by their predecessors. No less
than in the past, the police now need workable
standards which will enable them to act not only
responsibly, but effectively.1
4
In 1968, Professor Packer warned that the same
decisional process which the Warren Court used to
establish the "due process" model of criminal proc-
23 The modem conditions which have developed since
the enactment of the fourth amendment and which affect
its implementation are eloquently described in Amster-
dam, supra note 13, at 401.
ess might one day be used by the Supreme Court
to reestablish crime control norms.=s He suggested
that the trend could be reversed by either changes
in attitude toward the criminal process or changes
in personnel on the Court.2
Both of these changes have occurred and the
new judicial trend is at odds with the expansive
interpretation of the fourth amendment that has
evolved since the nineteenth century. A good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule is in step with
that trend and may be justified by arguing history,
precedent and policy. However, it should not be
adopted without careful consideration of the re-
quirements of the twentieth century and full cog-
nizance of the effect it will have upon fourth
amendment rights as we know them.
See H. PAcKER supra note 230, at 239-40.
2 See id at 240.
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